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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ACADEMIC TENURE: ITS HISTORICAL AND LEGAL MEANINGS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
COMPENSATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL FACULTY MEMBERS

LAWRENCE WHITE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the last ten years, America’s medical schools have endured an
economic earthquake of almost unimaginable proportions.
In 1992,
Georgetown University Law Professor Gregory Bloche identified and
described what he called “the developing financial squeeze on academic
medical centers,” attributing it to stinginess in federal health-care
reimbursement policy, the then-nascent (now largely realized) revolution in
third-party payment for clinical care, and the resulting reduction in crosssubsidies that supported more than forty years of growth in teaching and
research at American medical schools after the Second World War.1 Shortly

* Program Officer, Pew Charitable Trusts, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and formerly University
Counsel, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. B.A., Harvard University (1971); J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania (1975). The author wishes to thank the reference staffs at the Law
School and Health Sciences Center Libraries at the University of New Mexico for generous
research assistance provided during the preparation of this article. He also wishes to thank
Professor Jesse Goldner of the Saint Louis University School of Law and the staff of the SAINT
LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL for their editorial assistance and encouragement. The views
expressed in this article belong to the author, and should not be attributed to the organizations at
which he is currently or was formerly employed.
1. M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 SO. CAL. L. REV.
1035, 1046-61 (1992). For a perceptive treatment of the causes underlying the current financial
difficulties confronting academic medical centers, see John. K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report:
Rapid Changes for Academic Medical Centers (Second of Two Parts), 332 N. ENG. J. MED. 407
(1995). Mr. Iglehardt notes, for example, that:
Despite their success, academic medical centers have surprisingly fragile economic
foundations. Their many missions are financed through a complex web of crosssubsidies, because as a rule most functions – such as undergraduate and graduate medical
education, biomedical research, and the treatment of severe or unusual diseases – do not
pay for themselves. . . . As the system evolves to resemble a competitive marketplace
more closely, . . . the ability of academic medical centers to continue financing their
activities through cross-subsidies is problematic in the extreme. The reason is that payers
– employers, managed-care plans, and government, as well as patients – are placing more
emphasis on reducing the rate of increase in medical expenditures.
51
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after Professor Bloche’s article appeared, his warning of an impending
financial crisis in academic medicine became suddenly and palpably real. By
1996, according to the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”),
twenty percent of the nation’s teaching hospitals were losing money, some at
prodigious rates.2 As the decade drew to an end, at least two prominent
academic medical centers reported operating losses of more than $75 million
annually.3 Another academic medical center declared bankruptcy in 1998,
threatening the closure of major urban teaching hospitals and the loss of
thousands of health care jobs.4
In an effort to cope with economic hard times, academic medical centers
are struggling to become more entrepreneurial. They are forging alliances with
hospital systems perceived to be more adept at providing (and marketing)
Id. at 407 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See also David Blumenthal & Gregg S. Meyer,
The Future of the Academic Medical Center Under Health Care Reform, 329 N. ENG. J. MED.
1812 (1993).
2. Martin Van Der Werf, Changing Economics of Health Care Are Devastating Academic
Medical Centers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 21, 1999, at A38, A38-A39.
3. Id. at A38 (stating that the University of Pennsylvania Health Services System lost
nearly $90 million last year, while Georgetown University Medical Center has lost almost $120
million in the past two years).
4. See Big Pennsylvania Health System to File Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1998, at
B7. The AAMC predicts that in the next three years the number of academic medical centers
with annual operating deficits will approach fifty percent of the total. One recently enacted
federal statute – the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which reduces Medicare payments to hospitals
– will result in the loss of almost $15 billion in Medicare reimbursements to the nation’s teaching
hospitals in the five-year period between 1997 and 2002. See Van Der Werf, supra note 2, at
A38.
No organization has done a more diligent job of chronicling the worsening economic
plight of academic medicine or the reasons for it than the AAMC, the professional assembly of
American and Canadian academic medical centers. Through its official monthly journal
ACADEMIC MEDICINE, the AAMC regularly commissions and publishes thoughtful articles on the
effects managed care and other market forces are having on medical school governance, the
financial management of academic medical centers, faculty compensation policies, and faculty
tenure policies. See, e.g., Robert F. Jones & Jennifer S. Gold, AAMC Paper–Faculty
Appointment and Tenure Policies in Medical Schools: A 1997 Status Report, 73 ACAD. MED. 211
(1998); Paul F. Griner & David Blumenthal, AAMC Paper–Reforming the Structure and
Management of Academic Medical Centers: Case Studies of Ten Institutions, 73 ACAD. MED. 818
(1998).
In 1997, the AAMC, supported by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,
created the “Forum on the Future of Academic Medicine” (“Forum”) providing focused
assistance to university and medical school leaders in coping with market-driven changes in
clinical care. John Iglehart’s reports on the Forum’s deliberations are published in ACADEMIC
MEDICINE and, as the names of the papers suggest, usefully summarize causes and effects.
Session I–Setting the Stage, 72 ACAD. MED. 595 (1997); Session II–Finances and Culture, 72
ACAD. MED. 754 (1997); Session III–Getting from Here to There, 73 ACAD. MED. 146 (1998);
Session IV–The Realities of the Health Care Environment, 73 ACAD. MED. 956 (1998); Session
V–Implications of Basic and Applied Research for AMCs, 73 ACAD. MED. 1241 (1998).
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clinical services without losing money.5 Not surprisingly, “[t]he rise of cost
consciousness,” to use Professor Bloche’s felicitous phrase,6 has surfaced
tensions between medical school faculty members and a new generation of
bottom-line-oriented clinical administrators. Faculty fear that academic
medical centers will retreat from traditional academic values, while
administrators decry, in tones of increasing urgency, the perceived
irresponsibility of long-term commitments to teaching and research in an era of
unprecedented financial volatility.7
The tension is visibly manifested in fundamental disputes over the
meaning of faculty tenure in contemporary academic medicine. In 1995,
AAMC President Dr. Jordan Cohen warned of the cultural disharmony
between medical school administrators and tenured medical school faculty
members:
The existence of tenure in medical schools represents a linkage to the broader
academic culture of the university, with its traditional devotion to a free
exchange of ideas without threat of economic penalty. Yet, medical schools,
because of their increased involvement in the real world of health care
delivery, are also linked to the corporate culture, with its brutal devotion to
productivity without guarantees of economic security. The clash of these
cultures is reaching deafening proportions and will challenge the most adroit
academic administrators. If medical schools are to succeed, they must avoid
the Scylla of an ivory-tower disregard of new competitive realities and the
Charybdis of a corporate sellout of academic values.8

In the mid-1990s, academic medical centers, with varying degrees of buyin from their faculties, began wide-ranging examinations of their faculty
compensation policies. The AAMC convened two well-attended conferences
on faculty tenure and compensation issues, including one in 1997 with the
provocative title Legal Issues in Faculty Tenure and Compensation.9 By that

5. See Van Der Werf, supra note 2, at A39 (noting Tenet Health Care Corporation’s recent
purchase of St. Louis University Medical Center and Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation’s
eighty percent acquisition of Tulane Hospital).
6. Bloche, supra note 1, at 1052.
7. See Michael K. Magill et al., Cultures in Conflict: A Challenge to Faculty of Academic
Health Centers, 73 ACAD. MED. 871, 872-73 (1998).
8. Jordan J. Cohen M.D., Academic Medicine’s Tenuous Hold on Tenure, 70 ACAD. MED.
294 (1995).
9. The two conferences were: TENURE, COMPENSATION, AND CAREER PATHWAYS:
REEXAMINING THE FACULTY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ACADEMIC MEDICINE (1996),
featuring useful papers by former University of Virginia President Robert M. O’Neil
(“Reexamining the Meaning and Role of Tenure in Academic Medicine”) and Steven G. Olswang
(“Academic Freedom and Tenure: The United States and United Kingdom Experience”); and
LEGAL ISSUES IN FACULTY TENURE AND COMPENSATION (1997), featuring presentations by four
attorneys on legal issues involving academic medical center faculty, including compensation,
termination for cause, post-tenure review, and related subjects. These AAMC conference
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year, many academic medical centers had adopted new compensation
paradigms under which a portion but not all of a tenured faculty member’s
annual salary was explicitly protected against reduction – the implication being
that institutions were free to effect salary reductions for tenured faculty
members as long as adjusted salaries did not go below protected “floors.”10
Predictably, institutional policymaking in an area as sensitive as faculty
compensation triggered expressions of alarm from many faculty members.
Under what circumstances (if any) and in accordance with what procedures
can medical schools respond to budget deficits by adopting compensation
policies that allow for reductions in the compensation of tenured faculty
members? This question has already triggered grievances and litigation at
several medical schools.11 It is the postulate of this article that differences
between faculty members and administrators over tenure and faculty
compensation arise in part from lack of precision about the meaning of tenure
and its historical and legal relationship to compensation. The purpose of this
article is to limn the history of academic tenure in the United States – a history
of surprising brevity and some ambiguity – and explain in light of that history
what tenure means as a defining characteristic of higher education in this
country and as a legal term in litigation over faculty compensation.
Part II of this article explores the historic antecedents of the modern
concept of academic tenure. For at least three-quarters of a century, tenure has
been justified on two independent grounds: as the surest way to safeguard the
academic freedom of faculty members, and as a means of ensuring “economic
security” for the professoriate. For most of that time, little attention was given
to the latter justification. It is only in the last three years – literally – that the
American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) and other
thoughtful proponents of tenure have resurrected the “economic security” basis
for tenure and sought to ascribe a meaning to that term; and it is only in the last
three years that faculty litigants have advanced the theory that alterations in an
institution’s policies governing faculty compensation threaten the faculty’s
“economic security,” hence tenure itself.
Part III examines the contemporary meaning of academic tenure. It
enumerates the procedural protections that attach, as a matter of contract law,
when tenure is bestowed on a faculty member, and describes the circumstances
– substantive and procedural – under which the employing institution of higher
materials are particularly useful to those who wish to explore the relationship between academic
tenure and faculty compensation policies. Copies of conference materials can be obtained from
Dr. Robert F. Jones, Associate Vice President, Section for Institutional and Faculty Policy
Studies, AAMC, 2450 N Street, N.W., Room 411, Washington, D.C. 20037, or from the AAMC
at <http://www.aamc.org>.
10. For illustrations of policies incorporating so-called “X-Y-Z” compensation formulae, see
Jones & Gold, supra note 4, at 217-18.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
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education can terminate a tenured faculty appointment. Part III concludes by
examining the AAUP report entitled Tenure in the Medical School.12
Published in 1996, this report was of path-breaking importance in that it
represented the first sustained attempt to give content to the term “economic
security” and to delineate the parameters of a medical school’s ability,
consistent with tenure, to modify compensation policies for tenured faculty.
Finally, Part IV summarizes the modest amount of litigation that has been
spawned by salary reductions affecting tenured faculty members. In the last
two years, the number of lawsuits brought by tenured medical school faculty
members has slowly grown, and it is not too early to draw some conclusions
about judicial reactions to the argument by faculty members that the
“economic security” dimension of tenure protects them against changes in
compensation policies occasioned by financial distress at the medical schools
in which they are employed. As we shall see, courts have so far been resistant
to that argument.
II. AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF ACADEMIC TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES13
Tenure and the associated concept of hierarchical academic rank, including
untenured instructors, untenured assistant professors, tenured associate
professors, and tenured full professors, are relatively new phenomena in
American higher education. The privately-supported, predominantly sectarian
institutions of higher education founded in this country in the seventeenth,
12. Tenure in the Medical School, 82 ACADEME 40 (Jan.-Feb. 1996) (prepared by
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, American Association of University
Professors). ACADEME is the official publication of the AAUP.
13. It is impossible to write about the history of academic tenure in this country without
borrowing heavily from the work of Professor Walter Metzger, the subject’s preeminent
authority. Although more than a quarter of a century old, Professor Metzger’s 1973 essay
Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay remains the best starting point for serious
scholarship on the subject. See Walter Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical
Essay, in COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE 93
(1973) [hereinafter Metzger, Academic Tenure]. For those desiring an extended treatment of the
topics covered in Professor Metzger’s article, see ROBERT HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955) [hereinafter
HOFSTADTER & METZGER]. Published as part of Columbia University’s “American Academic
Freedom Project,” this 527-page treatise comprehensively surveys the history of academic
freedom and its relationship to academic tenure at American colleges and universities. Part I,
written by Professor Hofstadter, focuses on what the authors call “the prehistory of academic
freedom in our own country” from the founding of Harvard College in 1636 to the end of the
Civil War. See id. at 78-113. Part II, written by Professor Metzger, see id. at 275-506, chronicles
the coming of the modern university and the development of “[a] self-conscious and wellformulated rationale for academic freedom” based on freedoms asserted by faculty and students
in the great German universities of that epoch. See id. at xii. Like other authors who precede me
in exploring the history of academic tenure in the United States, I gratefully acknowledge
Professor Metzger’s contributions, reflected in what follows.
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eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries used governance structures and
instructional methods derived in large measure from Oxford and Cambridge
Universities, the institutions from which most of the colony’s educators had
graduated.14 Governance was the responsibility of self-perpetuating boards of
“fellows,” who in turn appointed “tutors” to perform the mundane task of
instructing students in class.15 Until the middle of the eighteenth century, there
was no rank higher than “tutor” on most American college faculties.16 Tutors
were appointed for short fixed terms, with no guaranteed right to
reappointment for successive terms.17
Beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, colleges used gifts from
merchants and wealthy graduates to establish endowed chairs, and chairholders
were given an exalted title new to American institutions: professor.18 In
deliberate contrast to the lowly tutors, professorial appointments were without
limit of time, although governing boards could terminate professors for
inadequate performance of duty or misconduct.19
A.

The Forces that Shaped Modern Academic Tenure

For much of the eighteenth century, tenure was defined more by what it
was not than by what it actually signified. Eighteenth-century tutors were
ordinarily engaged under short “term” appointments, and were required to
stand for reappointment every two or three years.20 In contrast, bequests
establishing new professorships frequently fixed the appointment “durante
vita” -- for the life of the incumbent.21 Professors were freed from the
obligation to apply for reappointment at periodic intervals, although, as
historians observed, this was far from tenure in the modern sense given the
ease with which professors could be dismissed by governing boards for the
most inconsequential of reasons.22
14. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 114-16.
15. Id. at 110-11.
16. Id. at 120.
17. For a lively description of higher education in colonial America, see id. at 114-51. See
generally LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (1965);
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD 1636-1936 (1936).
18. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 120.
19. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 230.
20. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
21. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 120.
22. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 230 (noting that “[a]lthough a professor
usually held office indefinitely on good behavior, his tenure depended upon usage and had no
legal status” thus, “he could be fired at will by the governing board . . . [sometimes without] a
hearing.”).
Tenured faculty members who challenged their dismissals in court were singularly
unsuccessful in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Typical of the judicial rhetoric
of that era was the dismissive decision of Hartigan v. Board of Regents of West Virginia
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The modern concept of academic tenure owes its existence to three great
shaping events of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: exposure of
American educators to the German university and the German concept of
lehrfreiheit, loosely translated as a faculty member’s academic freedom as a
teacher and researcher; enactment of the Morrill Act in 1862; and a series of
path-breaking court cases decided a century ago known collectively as the
“Economics” cases.
1.

The German Influence

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, American colleges were
overwhelmingly sectarian. Their mission was to produce clergymen, and their
method of instruction was primarily rote memorization.23 Faculty did little
original research, and scarcely imagined their mission to include training in
scholarship.24 But in the nineteenth century, more than nine thousand
Americans studied in what were at that time the world’s preeminent research
universities, the universities of Germany, and many of them joined the
teaching ranks when they completed their studies and returned to the United
States.25 While overseas, they discovered colleagues who envisioned their jobs
as members of university faculties quite differently, due in part to the German
concept of lehrfreiheit. “By lehrfreiheit,” wrote Professors Hofstadter and
Metzger, “the German educator meant two things [:]”
He meant that the university professor was free to examine bodies of evidence
and to report his findings in lecture or published form -- that he enjoyed
freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry . . . . This freedom was not, as the
Germans conceived it, an inalienable endowment of all men, nor was it the
superadded attraction of certain universities and not of others; rather, it was the

University, 38 S.E. 698 (W. Va. 1901). Hartigan involved a university president who asked the
board of regents to terminate the appointment of an anatomy professor who had served on the
faculty for thirteen years. The president accused the professor of being “untruthful [and]
unscientific” and of being “wasteful of the university property committed to his charge . . . .” Id.
at 706 (Dent, J., dissenting). The board ordered that the university terminate the professor’s
appointment without notice. When the professor sought a writ of prohibition restraining the
board from carrying out its order, the court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to review actions by
governing boards affecting the employment of faculty members: “Some one will ask, is the board
of regents to do as it pleases, without control, erroneous as its actions may be? Yes, so far as the
courts are concerned.” Id. at 700.
Other nineteenth century courts were hostile to faculty members in cases involving
terminations of long-term appointments. See, e.g., Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schs.,
58 N.W. 1042 (Wis. 1894); Devol v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ariz., 56 P. 737 (Ariz. 1899);
Ward v. Board of Regents of Kan. State Agric. College, 138 Fed. 372 (8th Cir. 1905); Darrow v.
Briggs, 169 S.W. 118 (Mo. 1914).
23. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 229.
24. Id. at 369.
25. Id. at 367.
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distinctive prerogative of the academic profession, and the essential condition
of all universities. In addition, lehrfreiheit . . . also denoted the paucity of
administrative rules within the teaching situation: the absence of a prescribed
syllabus, the freedom from tutorial duties, the opportunity to lecture on any
subject according to the teacher’s interest. Thus, academic freedom, as the
Germans defined it, was not simply the right of professors to speak without
fear or favor, but the atmosphere of consent that surrounded the whole process
of research and instruction.26

Exposure to German academic governance opened the eyes of the
American professoriate to the hitherto radical notion that academic freedom
protected faculty members from the very powers that were responsible for their
appointment and continued employment: trustees and administrators. In a
florid passage from his 1869 inaugural address as President of Harvard
University, Charles W. Eliot extolled freedom from institutional interference as
the quintessential faculty right:
A university must, . . . above all, . . . be free. The winnowing breeze of
freedom must blow through all its chambers. It takes a hurricane to blow
wheat away. An atmosphere of intellectual freedom is the native air of
literature and science. This university . . . demands of all its teachers that they
be grave, reverent and high-minded; but it leaves them, like their pupils, free.27

In 1876, the Johns Hopkins University was founded as the first American
institution offering graduate education on the German model.28 The avowedly
nonsectarian universities that opened their doors at the end of the century –
Chicago and Stanford foremost among them – hired faculty members who
were expected for the first time to engage in rigorous research.29 As curricular
26. Id. at 386-87. See Walter P. Metzger, The German Contribution to the American Theory
of Academic Freedom, in THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN FORMATION: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND REPORTS 215 (Walter P. Metzger ed., 1977).
Professors Hofstadter and Metzger reproduce correspondence exchanged in 1815
between the man who was soon to be the first president of the University of Virginia, Thomas
Jefferson, and a young Harvard faculty member named George Ticknor whom Jefferson hoped to
lure away to his new university. After Ticknor visited the University of Gottingen, he wrote to
Jefferson:
No matter what a man thinks, he may teach it and print it; not only without molestation
from the government but also without molestation from publick [sic] opinion . . . . If truth
is to be attained by freedom of inquiry, as I doubt not it is, the German professors and
literati are certainly on the high road, and have the way quietly open before them.
HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 391.
27. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
28. DONALD KENNEDY, ACADEMIC DUTY 26 (1997). Of the fifty-three Hopkins faculty
members when the university was first established, nearly all had studied at German universities.
They adopted the German method of instruction, relying on lectures, seminars, and laboratories.
So profound was the German influence on pedagogy at Hopkins that the new university was
called “Göttingen at Baltimore.” HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 377.
29. KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 26-27.
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boundaries expanded, so did the potential for ideological friction between
faculty and trustees – and so did the perceived need for procedures to protect
the academic freedom of faculty members.
2.

The Morrill Act

The Morrill Act expanded and democratized American higher education in
the years after the Civil War by making public lands available for the
establishment of so-called “land-grant colleges.”30 Impetus behind the Morrill
Act began with the great London and New York expositions of the 1850s,
which showcased the scientific and technological advances of the Industrial
Revolution and persuaded a generation of American educators that the
standard curriculum of the day was “hopelessly antiquated.”31 The Morrill Act
gave to every state that remained in the Union a minimum grant of 90,000
acres of public land to establish colleges dedicated to engineering, agriculture,
mechanical arts, and vocational training.32 Subsequent legislation, enacted in
1890, extended the land-grant college program to the southern states that had
seceded during the Civil War.33
For our purposes, the significance of the land-grant college enactments lay
in the large-scale increase of college and university faculty members in the
latter part of the nineteenth century, all of whom were state government
employees who enjoyed defined employment rights under state law. The landgrant colleges, including the University of Wisconsin in the 1870s and Cornell
University in the 1880s, divided professorial rank into three sub-ranks:
assistant, associate, and full professor.34 These land-grant colleges also
developed codified procedures governing advancement from one rank to the
next.35 Additionally, most colleges and universities during this period adopted
the notion of “probationary service” prior to advancement to a tenured rank,
and the correlative “up or out” rule at the end of the probationary period.36
3.

The Celebrated “Economics” Cases

Ideological turbulence roiled the economics profession at the beginning of
the twentieth century, as traditional business-oriented departments of
economics were challenged by a new generation of radical faculty members
who espoused free trade, the abandonment of the gold standard, the regulation
30. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (which “apportion[ed] to each State a quantity
[of public land] equal to thirty thousand acres for each senator and representative in Congress”).
31. ALLAN NEVINS, THE STATE UNIVERSITIES AND DEMOCRACY 2 (1962).
32. Morrill Act, 12 Stat. 503. See also METZGER & HOFSTADTER, supra note 13, at 380-82.
33. See 26 Stat. 417 (1890) (giving funds from the sale of public lands to “each State and
Territory for the more complete endowment and maintenance of colleges”).
34. Metzger, Faculty Tenure, supra note 13, at 123.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 121.
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of monopolies, public ownership of utility companies, and other positions
deemed heretical by the corporate magnates serving as trustees at most of the
public and private institutions of the day.37 Not surprisingly, schisms
developed within leading economics departments and between radical
economists and conservative university presidents and trustees.
Professors Hofstadter and Metzger brilliantly describe the origins of the
ideological confrontations that repeatedly disrupted economics departments at
major universities at the end of the nineteenth century.38 For the first time in
the nation’s history, industrialists were making large fortunes and using them
to support universities on an unprecedented scale. “Inevitably,” Hofstadter and
Metzger dryly observed, “the increase in the size of gifts changed the relations
of donor and recipient. Borrowing a term from economic history, one may say
that the givers became entrepreneurs in the field of higher education.”39 Just as
inevitably, enormous gifts were rewarded with appointments to institutional
governing boards; “[t]hus, big businessmen and professors came into fateful
contact.”40
Economics departments proved to be a particularly combustible meeting
place. In 1901, the former President of Kansas State Agricultural College,
Thomas Elmer Will, wrote that at least twelve faculty members from
economics and political science departments had been removed from tenured
positions in the preceding eight years for espousing “heretical social and
economic writings” on such topics as the need to regulate monopolies, the
advantages of free silver, the anti-democratic impulses of imperialism, and the
need for immigration reform.41 The most notorious of these cases involved
Edward A. Ross, a tenured professor of economics at Stanford University. In

37. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 413.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 414.
40. Id. at 418. Before the Civil War, the largest philanthropic gift ever given to an American
college was Abbott Lawrence’s $50,000 gift to Harvard. But in the 1880s, the estate of a
California railroad magnate contributed $24 million to establish Stanford University; the founder
of Standard Oil gave $34 million to the University of Chicago; and John D. Rockefeller
contributed $46 million to establish a foundation called the General Education Board to provide
financial support to secondary and postsecondary schools throughout the United States. Id. at
413-14.
41. Id. at 420-21. President Will viewed the decade’s developments from a unique vantage
point. In the election of 1896, Republican Party majorities in both houses of the Kansas
legislature were displaced by a coalition of Democrats and Populists, who immediately assumed
control of the governing board of the state land-grant college. All faculty contracts in the
economics department were terminated, and Will, an advocate of reform and a friend of Populist
legislators, was appointed to the presidency. Two years later, the Republican Party returned to
power. Will was dismissed, a new president was installed, the appointments of all the new
members of the economics department were terminated, and their places were filled with loyal
Republicans. Id. at 424-25.
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1900, Stanford’s legendary President David Starr Jordan dismissed Professor
Ross at the insistence of university trustee Jane Lathrop Stanford, the widow of
the University’s founder, Leland Stanford.42 Mrs. Stanford’s well-connected
industrialist friends were offended by Professor Ross’s unorthodox advocacy
of populist economic policies.43 Because of Ross’s national prominence as
secretary of the American Economic Association and the fledgling university’s
academic aspirations, Ross’s firing captured the attention and imagination of
the national media, who “seized upon the incident as a parable of the fate of
liberal professors in institutions dominated by the moneyed class.”44
Matters worsened in 1913, when another prominent economics professor,
William Fisher, resigned from the Wesleyan University faculty at the
insistence of the institution’s president.45 Professor Fisher’s offense was the
off-campus delivery of a speech that advocated relaxing the rigid rules for the
observance of the Sunday Sabbath. Professor Fisher’s colleagues were
outraged when they learned of the president’s action and the Economics
Department chairman -- who had himself resigned in protest from the Stanford
faculty in the wake of the Ross firing -- tried to organize a faculty boycott of
the president’s efforts to hire a replacement for Professor Fisher.46 Other
faculty members sought to interest the American Economic Association in
conducting an investigation, but their effort yielded no published result
because, as Professor Metzger tersely reports, “the chairman [of the
investigating committee] became convinced that Fisher had not been faultless
in conduct and because he wished to reserve full reportage for the worthy
pure.”47
These “Economics” cases offered an important lesson for thoughtful
proponents of faculty rights. The cases showed that presidents, trustees, and
other powerful people who were opposed to the expression of unorthodox
views and willing to use their power to suppress such expression could
repeatedly threaten academic freedom. By the beginning of the twentieth
century leaders in the American academic community were tentatively
beginning to draw the connection between two strands of thought -- one
philosophical, one legal. The German-inspired notion that a university could
achieve greatness only by according faculty the unfettered right to determine
for themselves what to teach and how to teach it became linked to the need for
a codified system of procedural protections that would shield faculty members
who exercised their academic freedom from the intemperate reactions of
42. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 138.
43. Id. Ross campaigned for free silver, a ban on oriental immigration, municipal ownership
of utilities, and public scrutiny of the Southern Pacific Railroad. Id.
44. Id. at 139.
45. Id. at 146.
46. Id. at 147.
47. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 148.
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administrators and trustees. Professors Hofstadter and Metzger describe the
moment these two strands first converged in a significant way, when Harvard’s
venerated President Charles W. Eliot delivered the Phi Beta Kappa address at
that institution’s commencement exercises in 1907.48 Invoking more than a
decade’s turbulence in departments of economics at Harvard and other
universities, Eliot focused his remarks on fractious relations between
professors and lay boards of trustees: “[S]o long as . . . boards of trustees of
colleges and universities claim the right to dismiss at pleasure all the officers
of the institution in their charge, . . . there will be no security for the teachers’
proper freedom . . . .”49 Eliot’s statement was one of the first explicit links
drawn between academic freedom as a defining characteristic of American
higher education and protections afforded by tenure as a means of
safeguarding academic positions against administrative encroachment.
As originally conceived a century ago, academic tenure was a means to
nurture and protect academic freedom. Conspicuously absent from the rhetoric
of that era was any reference to tenure as a way to enhance the economic
stature of faculty members. In fact, faculty members, if not wealthy, were
comparatively well-to-do in pre-industrial America. At the end of the
nineteenth century, professors’ salaries were seventy-five percent higher than
those of clerical workers; seventy-five percent higher than those of Methodist
and Congregational ministers; significantly higher than the wages of social
workers, librarians, journalists, and other categories of professionals; and three
hundred percent higher than the wages of manual laborers.50 It was not until
1915 and “[t]he addition of a new wealthy extreme” to American society in the
form of industrialists, financiers, and others who earned fortunes in the years
before the Great War that compensation first emerged as a faculty concern
bearing a relationship to the justification for academic tenure.51
B.

The Founding of the American Association of University Professors

In 1913 Arthur Lovejoy, a philosophy professor at the Johns Hopkins
University, and seventeen other Hopkins professors circulated a letter to

48. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 398.
49. Id.
50. See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 466 n.181.
51. Professors Hofstadter and Metzger note:
The addition of a new wealthy extreme to the range of classes in America seemed to
depress and demote all the others. Compared with the enormous returns that accrued to
business, the professor’s emoluments seemed small. Compared with the high adventure
of finance and the epics of industrial derring-do, his existence seemed drab. Compared
with the honors heaped on the practical men, the distinctions accorded the thinking man
seemed grudging and picayune. The illusion of a paradise lost was viewed against a
perceptual field of sharp contemporary social contrasts.
Id. at 467.
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colleagues at nine leading American universities urging them to support the
formation of a national association of professors. Six hundred professors
accepted Professor Lovejoy’s invitation to become charter members of the new
organization, christened the American Association of University Professors
(“AAUP”).52
Professor Lovejoy proposed two principal tasks for the new organization:
(1) “the gradual formulation of general principles respecting the tenure of the
professional office and the legitimate ground for the dismissal of professors,”
and (2) the establishment of “a representative judicial committee to investigate
and report in cases in which freedom is alleged to have been interfered with by
the administrative authorities of any university . . . .”53 Professor Metzger
captures the significance of Professor Lovejoy’s formulation of the AAUP’s
two principal undertakings:
The first proposal looked forward to tenure rules that would be shaped to the
interest of professors rather than to the interest of lay controllers and that
would be standardized for the entire nation rather than left to each campus
ward. The second proposal, remarkable for its audacity, urged the organized
professors to set themselves up as the judges of administrative conduct in all
those tangled and bristling affairs that end in academic dismissals. But it was
in the joining of these two proposals that their historic significance can be said
to lie. For many years, professors had evidenced concern about their security
of tenure. And for many years . . . professors had sought ‘academic freedom’ –
immunity from institutional sanctions in matters of expression and belief.
What was so unusual and worthy of mark was the marriage of these two
concerns in one professional plan of action.54

The AAUP’s first significant achievement was the formulation in 1915 of
the General Declaration of Principles (“1915 General Declaration”).55 The
1915 General Declaration was one of the first efforts to draw an explicit
analytic connection between academic freedom as the defining characteristic of
American higher education and tenure as the most effective means for
preserving and protecting academic freedom.56 More important for our
purposes, the 1915 General Declaration contributed another important strand
to the development of academic tenure in the United States: the articulation of
52. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 138. The founding of the AAUP is amply
chronicled in essays, reports and books authored, in the main, by members of the AAUP’s
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure. See, e.g., Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic
Freedom—Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1965),
reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, at 242, 253 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967);
HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 13, at 468-90.
53. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 135-36 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
55. See 1915 GENERAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC TENURE, reprinted in
FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY 393 (William W. Van Alstyne ed., 1993).
56. Id. at 399, 405-06.
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a link between academic tenure and faculty compensation.57 In a long passage,
the 1915 General Declaration addressed, for the first time, the financial
aspirations of university faculty members and offered a rationale for tenure as
a substitute for wealth:
If education is the corner stone of the structure of society and if progress in
scientific knowledge is essential to civilization, few things can be more
important than to enhance the dignity of the scholar’s profession, with a view
of attracting into its ranks men of the highest ability . . . . This is the more
essential because the pecuniary emoluments of the profession are not, and
doubtless never will be, equal to those open to the more successful members of
other professions. It is not, in our opinion, desirable that men should be drawn
into this profession by the magnitude of the economic rewards which it offers;
but it is for this reason the more needful that men of high gifts and character
should be drawn into it by the assurance of an honorable and secure
position . . . .58

In 1925, the American Council on Education called a conference for the
purpose of discussing the principles of academic freedom and tenure.59
Representatives of the AAUP and other higher education organizations were
invited to attend. The conference’s tangible product was the 1925 statement
from its Conference on Academic Freedom and Tenure (“1925 Conference
Statement”), a document remarkable for two reasons: first, because it
constituted an explicit endorsement by a body of college presidents of the
principle that academic tenure is essential to safeguard the academic freedom
of faculty members; and second, because it was the first effort to develop
codified rules of fair procedure for the adjudication of tenure-related disputes
by faculty bodies.60
C. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure
(“1940 Statement of Principles”) is widely accepted and widely cited as the
most influential expression of tenure principles to be found anywhere in the

57. Id. at 397, 405-06.
58. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
59. See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 26 (1990).
60. Metzger, Academic Tenure, supra note 13, at 151-52. The 1925 Conference Statement is
reprinted in XI AAUP BULL. 99 (1925). The 1925 Conference Statement was notable in another
pertinent respect. It was the first document to posit that “financial exigency” could serve under
appropriate circumstances as a justification for terminating tenured appointments. Although it
did not define the term, it did provide that “[t]ermination of permanent or long-term appointments
because of financial exigencies should be sought only as a last resort, after every effort has been
made to meet the need in other ways and to find for the teacher other employment in the
institution.” XI AAUP BULL., at 101.
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extensive literature on American higher education.61 Elaborating on themes
tentatively expressed in the 1915 General Declaration and 1925 Conference
Statement, the 1940 Statement of Principles explains tenure’s central purposes:
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically (1) freedom of teaching and
research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability.
Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to
society.62

Here, in a form more succinct than in the 1915 General Declaration, the
AAUP drew a direct analytic connection between tenure and faculty
compensation.63 As we shall see, however, it was not until the mid-1990s that
the AAUP endeavored to give any content to the “economic security” language
in the 1940 Statement of Principles.
III. TENURE AS A CONTRACTUAL CONCEPT
A.

The Contractual Meaning of Academic Tenure.

Tenure is a contractually enforceable institutional promise relating to the
duration of a faculty appointment.64 As past AAUP General Counsel William
Van Alstyne notes:
Tenure, accurately and unequivocally defined, lays no claim whatever to a
guarantee of lifetime employment. Rather, tenure provides only that no person

61. The definitive history of the 1940 Statement of Principles was written in 1990, on the
fiftieth anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles’ adoption, by none other than Professor
Walter Metzger. See Metzger, supra note 59, at 3. For other treatments of the central role of the
1940 Statement of Principles in the history and development of academic freedom and tenure in
the United States, see Matthew W. Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of Private Higher
Education, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1119, 1150-51 (1980) (noting that “[t]he 1940 Statement . . . has
become so widely accepted throughout American higher education that it has achieved judicial
recognition as a usage of the profession”); HARRY T. EDWARDS & VIRGINIA DAVIS NORDIN,
HIGHER EDUCATION & THE LAW 218 (1979) (“[t]he definition of tenure which is most prevalent
in American higher education is found in the 1940 Statement of Principles”).
62. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (1995)
[hereinafter AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS]. This compendium, commonly called the
“Redbook,” encompasses the full range of AAUP policy statements, from the 1940 Statement of
Principles to detailed implementing policies on governance, professional ethics, discrimination,
student rights, fringe benefits, and many other subjects. The volume includes a good index, a
bibliography and useful essays explaining how the AAUP adopts policies and how AAUP
policies are interpreted and applied by the courts.
63. Id.
64. See William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation and “Defense,” 57 AAUP
BULL. 328, 328 (1971).
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continuously retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified lengthy
period of probationary service may thereafter be dismissed without adequate
cause . . . . [T]enure is translatable principally as a statement of formal
assurance that . . . the individual’s professional security and academic freedom
will not be placed in question without the observance of full academic due
process.65

In accordance with the law of contracts, tenure means two things. First
and most important, a tenured appointment has no specified end date and is
therefore an appointment of indefinite term. Second, a tenured appointment
can be terminated only for reasons and only in accordance with procedures
that are specified as part of the contract and understood by the parties at the
time they enter into the employment relationship.66
The contract rights of faculty members are defined in many places, the
most significant of which are:


The institution’s governing documents (charter, bylaws, state statutes,
institutional regulations, and so forth);



The faculty handbook; and



The faculty member’s
appointment letter.67

individual

employment

contract

or

Tenure exists at a particular institution only if it is identified in the
governing documents, the handbook, or elsewhere as a contract right belonging
to eligible faculty members. Individual institutions are free to depart from
traditional notions of academic tenure, and even to do away with tenure
altogether. In fact, however, tenure is virtually universal in American colleges

65. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
66. See Ronald C. Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6 J.L. &
EDUC. 279, 280 (1977) (“[t]he legal effect of a tenure system is to place restrictions on the power
of the employing institution to terminate tenured professors except for cause and after a
hearing”); American Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 322 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (“[a]lthough academic tenure does not constitute a guarantee of life
employment . . . it denotes clearly defined limitations upon the institution’s power to terminate
the teacher’s services”), aff’d, 346 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
67. See Brown, supra note 66, at 281 (noting that “[q]uite commonly the authority to grant
tenure may be found in a comprehensive statutory scheme which provides the right to continued
employment subject only to removal in a prescribed manner for enumerated causes”); see also id.
at 282-84 (discussing the incorporation of handbook provisions into the tenure contract and other
sources of contractual rights). At most institutions, the handbook contains detailed definitions of
faculty ranks; prescribes the procedure by which faculty members are appointed, promoted, and
given tenure; establishes a maximum probationary period; and describes both the standards the
institution will employ to determine whether a tenured faculty appointment (or a non-tenured
appointment during the term of the appointment) should be terminated and the procedures to be
used in effecting that decision.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

ACADEMIC TENURE

67

and universities, and more than ninety-five percent of North American medical
schools have formal tenure systems for their faculty.68
What does it mean to say that tenure is a contractual concept? It means,
simply, that the tenure provisions in the institution’s faculty handbook and
tenure policies rise to the level of contractually enforceable institutional
promises that (1) cannot be modified unilaterally by the institution, and (2) can
give rise to pecuniary damage claims against the institution if they are
breached or not observed. Phrased more formally, the inclusion of tenure
provisions in a faculty handbook or institutional policy will usually be
construed by a reviewing court as an abrogation of the traditional common-law
“employment at will” doctrine. As the courts have held in a series of cases
over the last two decades, the tenure terms in faculty handbooks and
institutional policies become part of the employment contract between faculty
member and institution, regardless of whether or not they are incorporated by
specific reference in the individual faculty member’s appointment letter.69
The AAUP’s role in giving content to the term “tenure” and associated
terms is twofold. First, many faculty handbooks adopt the definitions of tenure
and academic freedom derived from the landmark 1940 Statement of
Principles and other AAUP policy documents as contractually enforceable
institutional policy. Some institutions do this by making specific references in
their handbooks to the 1940 Statement of Principles; others do it by
reproducing or paraphrasing the texts of pertinent AAUP policies. Even in the
absence of specific incorporation of AAUP terminology in institutional
documents, ambiguities about contract terms can be resolved under principles
of contract law by examining industrial “custom and usage,” and there is no
doubt that AAUP tenure standards are widely recognized as institutional norms
in American higher education.70
B.

The Commonly Understood Contractual Guarantees Associated with
Tenure

The 1940 Statement of Principles enumerates the essential requirements of
academic tenure:

68. See Jones & Gold, supra note 4, at 212.
69. See, e.g., Moffie v. Oglethorpe Univ., Inc., 367 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988);
McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58, 62-3 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980); Rehor v. Case Western Reserve Univ., 331 N.E.2d
416, 420 (Ohio 1975).
70. See generally Ralph S. Brown, Jr. & Matthew W. Finkin, The Usefulness of AAUP
Policy Statements, 64 AAUP BULL. 5, 8 (1978). For examples of the many instances in which
courts have used AAUP policy statements as guidelines for interpreting institutional tenure
policies, see, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1978); Browzin v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Karlen v. New York Univ., 464 F.
Supp. 704, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Drans v. Providence College, 410 A.2d 992, 994 (R.I. 1980).
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A written contract of employment clearly setting forth the precise
terms and conditions governing the appointment;



A probationary period of specified maximum length;



The notion that a term appointment cannot be non-renewed without
providing a minimum notice period to the affected probationary
faculty member; and



Minimum procedural standards for the termination of a tenured
appointment for cause.71

It also recognizes that, under certain circumstances, a tenured appointment
may be terminated because of a financial exigency, a concept given content in
other AAUP policy documents.72
As already noted, a tenured faculty appointment can be terminated only for
reasons and only in accordance with procedures that are specified as part of
the contract and understood by the parties at the time they enter into the
employment relationship. Under the law of contracts, an institution of higher
education owes legally enforceable obligations to tenured faculty members in
those rare instances when it seeks to terminate a faculty appointment. The
institution owes the faculty member a legitimate reason for its action and a set
of agreed-upon procedural protections before the termination is effected.
1.

Reasons Warranting Termination of Tenured Appointments

A tenured appointment can be terminated only for reasons. Under the
AAUP’s definition of tenure and under the tenure policies at most institutions
of higher education in this country, “reasons” sufficient to support the
termination of a tenured appointment fall within two categories: “cause” and
“reasons unrelated to cause.”
a.

Terminations for Cause

Under AAUP policy, an institution is free to define for itself the standards
constituting ground for for-cause termination, as long as those grounds
“relat[e], directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in their
professional capacities as teachers or researchers.”73 One of the most widely
respected definitions of “adequate cause” was formulated almost thirty years

71. See 1940 Statement of Academic Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 4. For a comprehensive review of
academic due process, see Louis Joughin, Academic Due Process, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
573 (1963).
72. Financial exigency and the allied concept of program discontinuation are discussed infra
Part III.B.1.b.
73. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 5(a), in
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 26.
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ago by the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education. Under that
definition, adequate cause exists if the institution can show:
(i) [D]emonstrated incompetence or dishonesty in teaching or research,
(ii) [S]ubstantial and manifest neglect of duty, . . . [or]
(iii) [P]ersonal conduct which substantially impairs the individual’s
fulfillment of his [or her] institutional responsibilities.74

Not only are these grounds narrow and highly qualified (e.g.,
“demonstrated incompetence” and “substantial and manifest neglect of duty”),
but at most institutions the body hearing the charges and deciding the accused
faculty member’s fate consists predominantly, or even wholly, of fellow
faculty members—a potentially difficult forum before which to argue the
institution’s case.
b.

Terminations Not for Cause

AAUP policy recognizes three narrow circumstances in which a tenured
faculty appointment may be terminated for reasons unrelated to the fitness of
the faculty member. These circumstances include financial exigency, program
discontinuation, and institutional merger or affiliation.
i.

Financial exigency

The 1940 Statement of Principles contains two passing references to
financial exigency. Without defining the term, the 1940 Statement of
Principles provides that the service of a tenured faculty member can be
terminated “only for adequate cause, except . . . under extraordinary
circumstances because of financial exigency.”75 Five paragraphs later, it
returns to the subject, stating that “[t]ermination of a continuous appointment
because of financial exigency should be demonstrably bona fide.”76 It was not
until the mid-1970s that the AAUP first devoted sustained attention to the
meaning of financial exigency and the circumstances under which a financially
troubled institution could invoke it as the justification for terminating tenured
faculty appointments.77 In 1975, the AAUP comprehensively revised its

74. COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE, supra
note 13, at 75.
75. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AAUP
POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 4.
76. Id.
77. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Financial Exigency, 62 AAUP BULL. 5 (1976). “Most of the
relevant policy formation [was] . . . first published in 1968. When the test of Regulation 4
seemed to need explanation . . . a major expansion on Regulation 4 got under way. After
Committee A and the council had twice overhauled it, the current version was first published
in . . . 1975 . . . .” Id. at 6.
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recommended institutional regulation on termination of faculty appointments.
The revised regulation contained lengthy provisions on financial exigency and
the related concept of program discontinuation.78 Almost immediately, courts
looked to the AAUP definitions as the dispositive starting point for analysis of
financially-inspired tenured terminations.79
A tenured faculty appointment may be terminated if that is the only way
for an institution to cope with a financial exigency, restrictively defined under
AAUP policy as “an imminent financial crisis which threatens the survival of
the institution as a whole and which cannot be alleviated by less drastic
means.”80 The AAUP definition is, in the words of the AAUP’s expert on

78. See Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 4,
in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23.
79. See, e.g., Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976); Browzin, 527 F.2d 843.
Lest there be any confusion, it is worth repeating an elementary truism under the law of
contracts. The AAUP’s standards on financial exigency and program discontinuation do not
apply at a given college or university unless those standards have been incorporated by reference
into the contractual employment relationship between institution and faculty member, for
example, by appropriate reference in the faculty handbook or board-approved tenure policies.
See, e.g., Linn v. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1989). Few
institutions have adopted the AAUP recommended institutional regulation in toto; in fact, not
many institutions have adopted financial exigency standards in any form. The importance of
AAUP pronouncements in this area arises because the 1940 Statement of Principles incorporates
the ambiguous reference to financial exigency. Given the prominence of the 1940 Statement of
Principles in defining the institutional common law of tenure, and given the deference courts pay
to the 1940 Statement of Principles, a faculty member would be hard pressed to argue that a
tenured faculty appointment could not be terminated on financial exigency grounds, just as an
institution would be hard pressed to maintain that the AAUP’s definition of financial exigency
would not be analytically useful in the absence of institution-endorsed alternative language. See
Krotkoff, 585 F.2d at 678 (noting that “[t]he national academic community’s understanding of the
concept of tenure incorporates the notion that a college may refuse to renew a tenured teacher’s
contract because of financial exigency so long as its action is demonstrably bona fide”).
80. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg.
4(c)(1), in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23 (emphasis added).
The AAUP policies on financial exigency and program discontinuation are masterfully
explained in an article by Professor Ralph Brown that appeared in ACADEME in early 1976.
Professor Brown, a member of the faculty at Yale Law School, served for many years as the
AAUP’s General Counsel and as a member of the Association’s Committee A on Academic
Freedom and Tenure. In 1975, the AAUP revised its recommended institutional regulations on
financial exigency and program discontinuation, and Professor Brown’s 1976 article endeavors to
explain the rationale for the AAUP policies and the meanings of key terms used in those policies.
No article treats the AAUP’s approach to these controversial subjects more lucidly than this one.
See Brown, supra note 77. For other commentaries on the AAUP’s policies on financial
exigency and program discontinuation, see David Fellman, The Association’s Evolving Policy on
Financial Exigency, 70 ACADEME 14 (May-June 1984); Robert Charles Ludolph, Termination of
Faculty Tenure Rights Due to Financial Exigency and Program Discontinuation, 63 U. DET. L.
REV. 609 (1986).
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financial exigency, Professor Ralph Brown, “an austere one.”81
Brown continues:

71

Professor

The Regulation is about termination of tenure appointments . . . . That is, it
describes crisis circumstances when it becomes permissible to break contracts.
This is a very serious thing to do, both as a matter of academic custom and of
positive law. So straight off . . . let us try to maintain the distinction between
conditions that permit on the one hand the firing of teachers with tenure . . .
and, on the other, a wide range of consequences that may fall under the milder
term “retrenchment.” Hard times may call for retrenchment; only a survivalthreatening crisis authorizes termination, as that word is used in the 1940
Statement . . . .82

The essence of financial exigency, then, as that term is used by the AAUP
(and as many courts have held), is the notion of imminent institutional peril
that can be alleviated only by terminating tenured faculty appointments.83
While it is clear that the institutional governing board is entitled to declare
financial exigency, and while courts will ordinarily defer to such declarations,
it is also clear that courts will insist on objective indicia of bona fide financial
distress, such as advance consultation with affected faculty governance
organizations, efforts to place affected faculty members in other jobs, and
observance of appropriate notice and severance-pay obligations.84
ii.

Program discontinuation

Program discontinuation is a more controversial ground for terminating
tenured appointments because it was not explicitly mentioned in the 1940
Statement of Principles and has been skeptically viewed by some faculty
members as the exception that could swallow up the general rule. Under the
AAUP’s recommended institutional regulations, a tenured faculty appointment
may be terminated if the institution elects, for programmatic reasons not
related to financial exigency, to discontinue a particular program or department
of instruction.85 While the recommended AAUP policy is replete with

81. Brown, supra note 77, at 6.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. See Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg.
4(c)(1), in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23.
84. See, e.g., Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Faculty Dismissal Because of Enrollment
Declines, 28 J. LAW & EDUC. 193, 195-99 (1999).
85. Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Reg. 4(d), in
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 23. Professor Brown observed that
“[r]ecognition [of the ‘program discontinuation’ rationale] has developed independently, and
without any explicit foundation in the 1940 Statement of Principles. It is accepted as a fact of
academic life that such events occur; and indeed it is healthy for the institution that they should.”
Brown, supra note 77, at 13. Some of the controversy surrounding the notion of program
discontinuation owes its existence to the suspicion many faculty members have that
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procedural limitations designed to narrow the circumstances under which a
program can be discontinued with the resulting loss of tenured faculty
positions,86 these limitations have not stopped institutions from reducing the
ranks of tenured faculty members through highly controversial
discontinuations of academic programs and departments.87
iii. Institutional merger or affiliation
Under narrowly defined circumstances, it is arguably consistent with
AAUP policy for one institution to void the appointments of tenured faculty
members as part of that institution’s merger into or affiliation with another.88
2.

Procedures for Tenure Termination

A tenured faculty appointment can be terminated only in accordance with
procedures that are specified as part of the contract, and understood by the
parties at the time they enter into the employment relationship. These
procedures usually entail at a minimum:
(a) A predetermination hearing before a body of faculty peers. At this
hearing, the faculty member is entitled to certain procedural rights, such as
receipt of a written set of charges, assistance from an “advisor” (who can,
but does not necessarily have to be an attorney), and a stenographic record
of the proceedings; and
(b) Deference to a suitable faculty role in institutional governance. Standards
for terminating appointments as well as procedures for hearings cannot be
imposed unilaterally by administrators; they must be formulated with due
regard for faculty primacy in all matters relating to faculty status.89

“‘discontinuance’ may be invoked in hard times as a substitute, perhaps a subterfuge, for an
exigency crisis that cannot be convincingly asserted.” Id.
86. Under the AAUP’s Recommended Regulation 4(d), an institutional decision to
discontinue a program must be based “essentially upon educational considerations, as determined
primarily by the faculty . . . .” The institution must make “every effort” to place a tenured faculty
member in “another suitable position” instead of terminating the faculty member’s employment.
If the faculty member requires retraining in order to perform other duties, then the institution is
obliged to offer “financial and other support” for such training. Faculty members who cannot be
redeployed are entitled to “severance salary equitably adjusted to the faculty member’s length of
past and potential service.” Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, Reg. 4(d), in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 25.
87. See, e.g., Texas Faculty Ass’n v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 946 F.2d 379 (5th Cir.
1991); Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363 (1st Cir. 1981).
88. See generally Report: On Institutional Mergers and Acquisitions, 68 ACADEME 1a
(Mar.-Apr. 1982). But cf. Gray v. Mundelein College, 695 N.E.2d 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998),
appeal denied, 705 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. 1998) (finding that a college and university did not intend for
their affiliation to extinguish the college’s tenure obligations).
89. See generally 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, reprinted in
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 62, at 179-85.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

ACADEMIC TENURE

73

For at least six decades, since the formulation of the landmark 1940
Statement of Principles, tenure has served the important end of protecting the
academic freedom of faculty members. Tenure bestows an appointment of
indefinite duration that can be terminated only for specified reasons and in
accordance with codified procedures assigning the principal fact-finding role to
the faculty itself. At the same time, however, our cursory exploration of the
history of academic tenure in the United States reveals two peculiarities of
particular relevance to the discussion of tenure’s relationship to compensation
in contemporary academic medical centers.
First, the contractual principle of tenure recognizes exceptions when
tenure, for legitimate, bona fide reasons, becomes financially or
programmatically unfeasible. If an institution faces a financial crisis that
threatens its existence as a whole and cannot, in the judgment of the governing
board, be alleviated through means less drastic than the termination of tenured
faculty appointments, or if for programmatic reasons the board determines to
discontinue a particular program of instruction, then under those circumstances
it is appropriate to terminate the appointments of tenured faculty members.
Second, even though the 1940 Statement of Principles contains a passing
reference to “economic security” as a second justification for the institution of
tenure, it is fair to say that between 1940 and 1996 little deference was given to
that phrase by the AAUP, scholars of the history of tenure, or by the courts.90
If an academic medical center can terminate tenured faculty appointments in
the event of a financial exigency or the discontinuation of a program or
department, thereby reducing the salaries of affected faculty members all the
way to zero, it is not too much to suggest that the same event would logically
justify less restrictive steps such as reductions in salary. For example, a twoyear college in Maryland reacted to massive state and county budget cuts by
eliminating academic programs and terminating the appointments of tenured
faculty members in those programs.91 Faculty members argued that the college
had no legal right to terminate programs prior to the declaration of an
institution-threatening financial exigency.92 The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals disagreed: “The actions taken by the College were designed to avoid
the necessity of declaring an ‘exigency.’ They were, nonetheless, indicative of

90. While some commentators and economists concentrated on the financial underpinnings
of the tenure system, see, e.g., Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, Tenure Issues in
Higher Education, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1999), few made any effort to plumb the analytic link
between tenure and the “economic security” language in the 1940 Statement of Principles. For
one elegant exception, see Ann H. Franke, Tenure and the Faculty Pocketbook, 81 ACADEME 108
(Mar.-Apr. 1995).
91. See Board of Community College Trustees v. Adams, 701 A.2d 1113 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1997).
92. Id. at 1139-40.
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attempts to resolve the present and anticipated financial shortfalls in order to
solve the financial problems without the necessity of taking that last step.”93
In sum, the history of academic tenure in the United States sheds little light
on the relationship between tenure and compensation. The best that can be
said is that tenure does not provide protection against the loss of academic
employment due to financial exigency or the discontinuation of academic
programs. If contemporary academic medical centers confront financial
distress of sufficient acuity to cause multi-million-dollar deficits and at least
one bankruptcy filing, to what extent are they justified, as a matter of contract
law, in adopting new compensation paradigms for tenured faculty? The AAUP
turned its attention to that question only recently.
In early 1996, a subcommittee of the AAUP’s Committee A on Academic
Freedom and Tenure drafted a thoughtful report entitled Tenure in the Medical
School.94 Although this report was published for comment in the JanuaryFebruary, 1996 edition of ACADEME, it was never formally adopted as an
expression of official AAUP policy. The report represents the individual
views of some of the AAUP’s most enlightened and experienced members on
the changing meaning of tenure in academic health care centers.
The report is remarkable in several respects. It candidly acknowledges the
many ways in which medical schools differ from other university programs,
including the emphasis on bottom-line business concerns and the “individual
entrepreneurial activities” in which faculty members must engage in order to
underwrite portions of their own salaries.95 Observing that “[t]he situation has
become much more complex since the time of the 1940 Statement of
Principles,” the report addresses the sensitive issue of compensation reductions
for tenured clinical faculty members.96 The report suggests “using a basic
science salary line as a guidepost for determining salary guarantees for clinical
faculty members,” and specifically endorses other “[c]reative approaches” to
faculty compensation as long as such approaches are “not overtly at odds with
existing Association policy.”97 While it is a bit unclear what the report means
by a “basic science salary line,” the report seems to suggest that compensation
reductions, even drastic reductions, for tenured clinicians are tolerable so long
as the reduced salary is not less than a benchmark pegged in some disciplined
fashion to salaries of tenured basic science faculty members.98

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1140 (emphasis added).
Report: Tenure in the Medical School, 82 ACADEME 40 (Jan.-Feb. 1996).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43 n.11.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Report: Tenure in the Medical School, supra note 94, at 42-44.
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IV. LITIGATION INVOLVING COMPENSATION FOR TENURED FACULTY
MEMBERS
In litigation involving the construction and interpretation of employment
contracts, courts adhere to the so-called “objective law of contracts” under
which the parties’ contract rights are determined in the first instance by
examining the written language in the contract.99 A faculty member alleging
breach of contract bears the initial burden of identifying the contract term that
would allegedly be violated if the university reduced his or her salary.
In contrast to some other fields, in which the principal terms of the
employment relationship are routinely reduced to an integrated contract of
employment, the contract by which faculty members are employed exists in a
non-integrated form. As one court indicated: “[I]n construing contracts of
employment in a university setting, we follow the instruction that such
employment contracts ‘comprehend as essential parts of themselves the hiring
policies and practices of the University as embodied in its employment
regulations and customs.’”100
In the relatively few cases in which faculty members have sought to link
tenure to compensation, most involve claims by administrators or department
chairs that they were entitled to retain their administrator’s stipend when they
returned to full-time faculty status -- a situation factually and legally distinct
from the tenure rights of medical school faculty members whose compensation
is reduced for financial reasons.101
In the first reported case involving a medical school faculty member’s
compensation, an academic medical center reduced the salary of a tenured

99. See, e.g., Patel v. Howard Univ., 896 F. Supp. 199 (D.D.C. 1995) (enunciating the
general principle that a court “adheres to the ‘objective law of contracts,’” whereby the “written
language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties
. . . .” (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 967 (D.C. 1984))).
100. Best, 484 A.2d at 967 (quoting Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir.
1969)). Accord, Bason v. American Univ., 414 A.2d 522, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Pride v. Howard
Univ., 384 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
101. See, e.g., Franken v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 714 P.2d 1308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985);
Barde v. Board of Trustees of Reg’l Community Colleges, 539 A.2d 1000 (Conn. 1988);
Tuckman v. Florida State Univ., 530 So.2d 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Kirsner v. University
of Miami, 362 So.2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 367 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 1979);
Janos v. University of Wash., 851 P.2d 683 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). But see Sorlie v. School Dist.
No. 2, 667 P.2d 400 (Mont. 1983); Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194
(Mont. 1981). Sorlie and Keiser arguably stand for the proposition that tenure protects faculty
members from reductions in salary. Franken, however, distinguished Keiser on the ground that it
involved the unusual instance of a faculty member who was “tenured as an administrator.” The
Franken court refused to apply Keiser when a faculty member was tenured “only as a professor”
and held an administrative position “at will” -- which, of course, describes the situation at most
institutions. Franken, 714 P.2d at 1310. It is fair to describe the Keiser holding as an aberration
that has commanded little adherence in other courts and other contexts.
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faculty member who did not generate as much grant money as expected.102
The faculty member brought suit on the ground that the salary reduction
violated his tenure rights.103 The court rejected his claim, holding that a
university has “a significant interest in having reasonable discretion to
administer its educational programs.”104 Moreover, the court continued, “the
strength of that interest gives schools leeway in making broad budget decisions
that may affect only a few employees.”105
Klinge v. Ithaca College posed the issue of whether tenure insulated a
faculty member from salary reduction.106 The plaintiff, a tenured full professor
at a private college in New York State, was demoted and had his salary
reduced. The professor reluctantly accepted his demotion but sued for breach
of contract on the ground that, as a tenured faculty member, his salary could
not be reduced. The court concluded that the college had the contractual right
to reduce a tenured faculty member’s salary by stating that “[c]learly, no
college is required to perpetuate . . . salaries and benefits each year, simply
because the incumbent is tenured . . . .”107
In the last two years, several lawsuits and grievances have been filed
challenging efforts by academic medical centers to revise compensation
policies for tenured faculty members. To date, none of these legal challenges
has led to a court decision establishing a link between tenure and protection
against salary reduction.
On July 20, 1998, a California trial court rendered a preliminary ruling in
Albrecht v. University of Southern California.108 In 1995, the School of
Medicine at the University of Southern California (“School”), in an effort to
address what administrators referred to as a “structural deficit” in the School,
102. Williams v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 6 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1194 (1994).
103. Id. at 292.
104. Id. at 293. See also Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975); Texas Faculty Ass’n v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 946 F.2d 379 (5th Cir.
1991).
105. Williams, 6 F.3d at 293. See also Texas Faculty Ass’n, 946 F.2d at 379.
106. Klinge v. Ithaca College, 167 Misc. 2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff’d in pertinent part,
652 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
107. Klinge, 167 Misc. 2d at 463. Cf. UDC Chairs Ch., Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v.
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of D.C., 56 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995). For many years, the UDC
had an unwritten practice of supplementing the salaries of department chairs (all of whom were
on nine-month academic contracts) by hiring them for three-month summer appointments. But in
the spring of 1992, in response to reduced funding from the Government of the District of
Columbia and depletion of its cash reserves, the University announced that department chairs
would no longer be employed in the summers. Thirty-three chairs filed suit alleging that they had
been deprived of customary summer employment without due process. A unanimous panel of the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the chairs’ claim that tenure protected them from
reductions in annual compensation. 56 F.3d at 1470.
108. No. BC160860 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 20, 1998).
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sent a form letter to all tenured members of the basic science faculty. The
form letter notified each faculty member that the School intended to implement
certain unilateral changes in the standard-form faculty appointment letter,
including a shortened employment term (from twelve to nine months), a
concomitant reduction of twenty-five percent in each faculty member’s annual
compensation, reductions in vacation time, the elimination or reduction of
other fringe benefits, and the implementation of new “productivity standards”
by which to determine compensation in future years.109 In late 1996, all the
tenured basic scientists filed suit for breach of contract. Their lawsuit alleged,
among other things, that the School’s unilateral implementation of these
changes violated their contract rights, including provisions in the faculty
handbook that incorporated the “economic security” language in the 1940
Statement of Principles.110
The court threw out major portions of the lawsuit. The court ruled that
“economic security” was too vague to rise to the level of an enforceable
contractual obligation:
A promise is not enforceable unless it is sufficiently definite to allow a court to
determine the scope of any duty created by the promise. Promises that are not
sufficiently certain to be enforced and which improperly impose on the court
the burden of making financial decisions cannot support a breach of contract
action. . . . During oral argument, the court inquired of plaintiffs’ position as to
the meaning of the [“economic security” language in the faculty handbook]
and the scope of the duty it allegedly creates. The response involved a vague
claim that plaintiffs are entitled to pay parity. . . . [T]he [tenure] contract is
unenforceable as a matter of law if interpreted in the manner advanced by
plaintiffs.111

Just a few days earlier, in Kirschenbaum v. Northwestern University, 112 an
Illinois trial court rejected the salary claims of a tenured Northwestern
University Medical School faculty member. The plaintiff, a tenured clinical
psychologist, alleged that his tenure rights were violated by a Medical School
salary policy (known as the “zero-based salary policy”) that required tenured
faculty members to generate sufficient extramural funding from patient
revenues or grants to defray one hundred percent of their salaries.113 The
plaintiff argued that, by virtue of the “economic security” provision in the 1940

109. See id. See generally Alfred G. Kildow, Medical School Faculty to Prompt a Vigorous
USC Defense (last modified Dec. 5, 1996) <http:www.usc.edu/ext-relations/news_service/chroni
cle_html> (click on “1996.12.02.html”).
110. See Albrecht, No. BC160860, slip op. at 1-2.
111. Id. at 2, 3.
112. No. 93-CH-8206 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 17, 1998), aff’d, No. 1-98-3059 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 29,
1999).
113. The Appellate Court of Illinois provides a detailed history of this case and the relevant
contract provisions. See Kirschenbaum, No. 1-98-3059, slip op. at 1-18.
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Statement of Principles, he was entitled to be paid by the University even in
the absence of external funding support.114 In a caustic decision, the trial judge
disagreed: “[T]enure itself, for medical school faculty, as a status, does not as a
matter of law require as a necessary incident thereof the payment of an annual
salary from university sources.”115 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision, finding that the “documents comprising the contract” awarded
the plaintiff tenure “for an indefinite period with no financial obligation on
Northwestern’s part.”116
Albrecht and Kirschenbaum are anomalous factually and are of limited
precedential significance; however, the two decisions manifest, at a minimum,
some level of judicial hostility to the kinds of objections tenured medical
school faculty members are making at many institutions in the face of
productivity-based compensation policies.
V. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
We are not far enough into the era of faculty litigation over medical school
compensation policies to know for certain whether the reaction of the courts in
Albrecht and Kirschenbaum is a harbinger of judicial resistance to the
argument by faculty plaintiffs that medical schools cannot lower the salaries of
tenured faculty members to cope with financial hard times. We can
nevertheless discern some practical lessons.
First and most important, the link between tenure and academic freedom is
venerable and well established; the link between tenure and economic security
is more tenuous. Over the last sixty years, the academic-freedom rights of
college and university faculty members have been exhaustively plumbed in
treatises, court decisions, and AAUP policy statements. Their right to
“economic security” is vaguer and more enigmatic. We instinctively
114. See Kirschenbaum, No. 93-CH-8206, slip op. at 2.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 35-36.
The most recent faculty lawsuit was instituted in early 1999 by a group of faculty
members from Georgetown University School of Medicine. See Glazer v. Georgetown Univ.,
Civ. A. No. 321-99 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 1999). The faculty in Glazer challenged the
implementation of a productivity-based compensation policy for medical school faculty members.
The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the policy violated their contract rights as tenured
faculty members and breached fiduciary obligations owed to the faculty by the President and the
Board of Directors. See id. In the spring of 1999, the lawsuit was settled. According to an article
dated May 28, 1999 in ACADEME TODAY, an online version of the CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, the university agreed to withdraw the compensation policy, supplement the grants of
two faculty members who had rededicated grant monies to cover salary shortfalls, and pay the
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. See Georgetown U. Settles Medical Professors’ Lawsuit Over Pay
Policy, ACADEME TODAY <http://www.chronicle.com>. See also Andy Amend, GU Rescinds
Med Center Pay Policy, THE HOYA, Feb. 26, 1999 (visited Jan. 19, 2000)
<http://www.thehoya.com/news/022699/news1.htm>.
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understand (even in the absence of controlling case law) that economicsecurity rights would be jeopardized if a college or university ordered either
mercilessly large or patently unwarranted salary cuts for tenured faculty
members. But as the AAMC’s analysis shows, compensation policies adopted
in the last few years at many of the nation’s academic medical centers are
neither extreme nor unwarranted. They guarantee tenured faculty members
generous salaries by comparison to academic salaries in the arts and sciences,
and they are being implemented by medical schools facing the specter of
indisputable, gaping, and in some instances worsening deficits.
As those who have endured it will be the first to attest, tenure litigation
produces few winners. It leaves anger, resentment, and financial tribulation in
its wake. It represents, in a sense, the failure of what one perceptive observer
has called the “social contract” on which the tenure system is bottomed.117 As
financial conditions at the nation’s medical schools worsen in the next five
years, the leaders of the academic medical community will be under renewed
pressure to reduce faculty payrolls. Academic tenure does not pose an
insuperable obstacle to the achievement of that goal, but we can learn from the
thirty years of experience the courts have had with an allied concept – financial
exigency – to discern some common-sense principles to protect against the
erosion of tenure.
Just as the AAUP, in its recommended institutional regulation on financial
exigency, insists on certain substantive and procedural safeguards to protect
the academic freedom of faculty members when financial constraints require
the abrogation of tenured faculty appointments, so too can an academic
medical center that needs to modify its compensation standards for tenured

117. In Henry Rosovsky’s words:
For me, the essence of academic tenure lies in . . . [the notion of] tenure as social
contract: an appropriate and essential form of social contract in universities. It is
appropriate because the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. It is essential because
the absence of tenure would, in the long run, lower the quality of a faculty. And faculty
quality is the keystone of university life. The best faculty will attract the ablest students,
produce the finest alumni, generate the most research support, and so on . . . .
Our jobs—as senior professors at major universities—require high intelligence, special
talents, and initiative. These attributes are in general demand: business, law, medicine,
and other professions are looking for people with similar characteristics. And some of
these careers promise, at considerable risk, far greater financial rewards . . . .
In my view, tenure carries the implication of joining an extended family; that is the social
contract. Each side can seek a divorce: the university only in the most extraordinary
circumstances, and the professor as easily as a male under Islamic law. It is not an
uneven bargain because the university needs its share of talented people, and professors
trade life-long security and familial relations for lesser economic rewards.
HENRY ROSOVSKY, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 183-84 (1990).
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faculty members incorporate safeguards designed to protect tenure and
academic freedom. Among these safeguards would be the following.
The justification for changes in compensation policy should be explained
to affected faculty members.
Faculty members, through their elected representatives and governing
organizations, should be involved in the formulation of academic policies
affecting tenure and compensation.
Compensation standards should be formula-based, to the maximum extent
possible, to avoid the appearance that individual compensation determinations
are being made for punitive reasons or for reasons that could implicate
academic freedom concerns.
In keeping with principles associated with financial exigency,
compensation reductions for tenured faculty members should be considered
only when other means of staunching operating deficits have been
implemented. Faculty compensation reductions should not be the first resort.
“[A] system of tenure, properly applied, is a guarantor of educational
quality.”118 As academic medicine confronts the challenges of the next
century, the tenure system will be tested as never before. It will endure and be
strengthened if faculty appreciate the extraordinary gravity of the financial
threats to academic medicine and administrators honor their obligations to
explain their actions and heed the voices of responsible faculty leaders.

118. Report: Tenure in the Medical School, supra note 94, at 45.

